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Ethnic Riots and Prosocial Behavior: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan
ANSELM HAGER University of Konstanz
KRZYSZTOF KRAKOWSKI Collegio Carlo Alberto
MAX SCHAUB WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Doethnic riots affect prosocial behavior?A common view among scholars of ethnic violence is thatriots increase cooperation within the warring groups, while cooperation across groups is reduced.We revisit this hypothesis by studying the aftermath of the 2010Osh riot inKyrgyzstan, which saw
Kyrgyz from outside the city kill over 400 Uzbeks. We implement a representative survey, which includes
unobtrusive experimental measures of prosocial behavior. Our causal identiﬁcation strategy exploits
variation in the distance of neighborhoods to armored military vehicles, which were instrumental in or-
chestrating the riot. We ﬁnd that victimized neighborhoods show substantially lower levels of prosocial
behavior. Importantly, we demonstrate that the reduction is similarly stark both within and across groups.
Using qualitative interviews, we parse out two mechanisms that help explain the surprising reduction in
ingroup prosociality: Victimized Uzbeks felt abandoned by their coethnics, and variation in victimization
created a feeling of suspicion.
INTRODUCTION
Ethnic riots occur with grim regularity around theglobe. Since 2010, Africa and Southern Asiaalone saw1,131 fatal riots (Raleighet al. 2010). In
Southern Asia, riots are the predominant form of
violence—far more common than military confrontations
orstateviolenceagainstcivilians(Kishi,Raleigh,andLinke
2016). Much existing scholarship discusses the causes of
riots (e.g., Kopstein andWittenberg 2018; Varshney 2002;
Wilkinson 2004). Studies using riots as the independent
variable, by contrast, remain relatively rare (e.g., Aidt and
Leon 2016). There is particularly little evidence on how
riots shape community relations, i.e., if and how riots im-
pact prosocial behavior within and across groups.
At ﬁrst glance, the effect of riots on prosocial be-
havior is Janus-faced. Riots seemingly lower co-
operation across the warring ethnic groups, while
ingroup solidarity is strengthened. This is the line of
argument in Horowitz’s seminal book The Deadly
Ethnic Riot. Drawing on evidence from over 250 riots,
the author hypothesizes that riots widen intergroup,
but narrow ingroup cleavages (Horowitz 2001, 445).
Robust empirical evidence that explores Horowitz’s
hypotheses, however, is currently missing. What is
more, the mechanisms that link riots to prosocial be-
havior have received scant empirical scrutiny.
A related literature on the effect of wartime vio-
lence on cooperation has yielded conﬂicting ﬁndings.
A number of studies ﬁnd that civil war victims show
increased prosocial behavior toward ingroup mem-
bers (see Bauer et al. 2016). A different set of studies,
however, questions this ﬁnding, linking wartime vi-
olence to lower levels of trust and prosociality toward
both outgroup and ingroup members (Kijewski and
Freitag 2018; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013).
Evidence that systematically explores outcomes
within as well as across groups remains scarce,
however, as do studies that explore mechanisms that
could explain these conﬂicting ﬁndings.
This article adds to the existing literature by revisiting
the relation between ethnic riots and prosocial behav-
ior.We draw onmicro-level evidence fromKyrgyzstan.
In June 2010, the city ofOsh saw an outburst of violence
pitting Kyrgyz assailants from surrounding villages
against Uzbek residents. The riot lasted four days, left
about 470deadandanother 1,900 injured (KIC2011, ii).
Importantly, the Osh riot marks a “typical case:”
a majority group (Kyrgyz) perpetrated violence
against a minority (Uzbeks), leading to large-scale
destruction,while security forces remainedpassive.Osh
thus marks a highly relevant case to study within- and
between-group cooperation in the aftermath of a
brutal riot.
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Tostudytheeffectof theriotoncommunitycooperation,
we ﬁelded a survey to 1,100 Osh residents fromAugust to
September of 2017—seven years after the riot. Behavioral
experiments serve as a robust measure of ingroup and
intergroup prosocial behavior. Comparing Uzbek
respondents living in affected areas to those not immedi-
ately affected, we ﬁnd stark differences in prosocial be-
havior: Victimized Uzbeks are signiﬁcantly less likely to
cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma game and allocate less
money in a dictator game compared to Uzbeks who were
spared. Our benchmark model estimates a 0.33 standard
deviation reduction in a comprehensive prosociality index.
The ﬁnding is robust to the inclusion of potential con-
founders, the use of a matching procedure as well as an
instrumental variable strategy, which exploits variation in
exposure of Uzbek neighborhoods to military barracks
from which assailants stole armored vehicles. Importantly
andagainstHorowitz’shypothesis, thereduction isvirtually
thesamewithinandacrossgroups:Uzbeks inaffectedareas
are less likely to act prosocially, no matter whether they
engage with a Kyrgyz or an Uzbek individual.
Why did Uzbeks reduce their cooperation with other
fellow Uzbeks? To explain this ﬁnding—which sets our
study apart from most studies on ethnic violence and
cooperation—we draw on qualitative evidence. We put
forth two mechanisms. First, Uzbek victims were disap-
pointed that their coethnics failed to support them during
the riot. Even the Uzbek government was quick to send
Uzbek refugees back to Kyrgyzstan. Victimization, thus,
createdafeelingofhavingbeenletdownbyothercoethnics
and an urge to punish, if even by small gestures, this per-
ceivedbetrayal.Second,Uzbekvictimsexpressedsuspicion
that they, not other Uzbek residents, had been targeted.
Victimization thus eroded trust within the Uzbek com-
munity, leading to reduced cooperation that continues to
this day.
Our article makes three contributions to the study of
ethnic violence. First, we add to a literature on ethnic riots.
While empirically and theoretically rich, many of the
insights into this literature rely on qualitative ﬁndings only.
We contribute a rare large-N study with reliable mea-
surement and stringent causal identiﬁcation. Second, we
contribute to the debate on violence and prosociality.
Recent work from wartime contexts tends to highlight the
positive effects of violent conﬂict on communities. Our
work leads us to a more sobering conclusion, highlighting
the scarring consequences of at least one type of violence:
ethnic riots.Third,wepoint out twonovelmechanisms that
may help explain why riots reduce cooperation within the
victimized group: riots make coordinated defense difﬁcult,
which creates a feelingof“being letdown,”and the relative
arbitrariness of targeting leads to suspicion within the
victimized group.
MOTIVATION
Do ethnic riots affect prosocial behavior? If so, do they
differentlyaffectcooperationwithinthevictimizedgroupas
compared to cooperation between victims and perpe-
trators? In linewithHorowitz,wedeﬁneanethnic riotasan
“intense, sudden, thoughnotnecessarilywhollyunplanned,
lethal attack by civilian members of one ethnic group on
civilian members of another ethnic group, the victims
chosen because of their group membership” (2001, 1). A
richliteratureexaminesthecausesofriots.Mostcommonly,
scholars argue that riots are triggered by ethnically framed
political competition (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2018;
Wilkinson 2004) and economic grievances (Bohlken and
Sergenti 2010; Mitra and Ray 2014). Other cited causes
include resentment related to status reversal (Petersen
2002) and deep-seated interethnic hostility (Horowitz
2001). Studies using riots as the independent variable,
however, are relatively rare.
There is little doubt that riots have deleterious effects on
lives and property. Their effect on community relations is
often seen as more ambiguous. Horowitz (2001)
hypothesizes that riots will widen the gap between the
conﬂicting groups, but will increase cohesion within the
victimized group. In line with Horowitz’s ﬁrst hypothesis,
Beber,Roessler,andScacco(2014)ﬁndthat the2005ethnic
riot in Sudan hardened negative outgroup attitudes, in-
creasing victims’ support for separation between theNorth
and the South of the county. Similarly, Dercon and
Gutie´rrez-Romero (2012) ﬁnd that the 2007 post-election
riot in Kenya lowered trust across ethnic groups (see also
Iyer and Shrivastava 2018).
Yet there is scant evidence to support the second hy-
pothesis fromHorowitz, namely that riots increase ingroup
cohesion.Dercon andGutie´rrez-Romero (2012) show that
trust in coethnics is not higher among riot victims inKenya.
In fact, Becchetti, Conzo, andRomeo (2014) show that the
victims of the same riot are more likely to exhibit un-
trustworthybehaviorinexperimentalgames—regardlessof
whether they play with coethnic or non-coethnic partners.
Evidence from the literature on war and prosociality is
likewise mixed. Most research investigating intergroup
relations ﬁnds them to be negatively affected by war
(Bauer et al. 2014; Hadzic, Carlson, and Tavits 2017;
Rohner,Thoenig,andZilibotti2013),althougheffect sizes
are often less pronounced than might be expected
(Dyrstad 2012; Whitt and Wilson 2007).
With regard towithin-group relations, researchershave
documented clear positive effects of wartime violence on
measures of collective action and egalitarian behavior
(e.g., Bauer et al. 2016; Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blatt-
man 2009;Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014;Voors et al.
2012). These effects are sometimes explained in terms of
increased investments in social capital rather thanphysical
capital (Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014). Others have
interpretedthemasevidencefordeep-reachingchanges in
preferences toward increased egalitarianism and proso-
ciality (Bauer et al. 2014; Voors et al. 2012).1
1 Such preference changes have been linked to a phenomenon psy-
chologists have labeled “post-traumatic growth” (Tedeschi and
Calhoun 2004)—the observation that the experience of violence can
leave individuals more able and willing to reach out to others. The
changed preferences can be parochial in nature (Choi and Bowles
2007; Mironova andWhitt 2018). According to this idea—resonating
with Horowitz’s hypotheses regarding the consequences of riots—
positive effects of war on ingroup cohesion are coupledwith increased
hostility toward theoutgroup(Baueretal. 2014;Rohner,Thoenig, and
Zilibotti 2013).
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In contrast to these relatively sanguineﬁndings, other
scholars have collected evidence on cases where war
had outright negative effects, including on within-group
relations. For example, Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt
(2013)document howcivilwarundermined trust among
villagers in Tajikistan. They explain their ﬁndings with
the social geography of their study site. Conﬂicting
groups settled closely intermixed, making it difﬁcult for
locals to differentiate between friend and foe. Similar
ﬁndings of reduced prosociality from the Balkans and
Uganda have been linked to post-traumatic stress dis-
order, a common psychological consequence of expo-
sure to violence (Cecchi and Duchoslav 2018; Kijewski
and Freitag 2018; Ruttan, McDonnell, and Nordgren
2015).
In sum, the literature offers mixed evidence on the
consequences of ethnic violence for prosociality—be it
in the context of civil wars or riots. What explains these
conﬂicting ﬁndings? In the case of wars, scholars have
tried to explain the contradictory ﬁndings by dis-
tinguishing between legacies of different types of
warfare (Krakowski 2018) and different victimization
strategies (Arjona andChaco´n 2018). Such distinctions,
however, do not apply to ethnic riots.
What is more, in the case of riots there is compelling
evidence that the causal arrow points in the opposite
direction.That is to say,prosocialityaffects riots.Notably,
Varshney(2002, 10), inadetailed studyofHindu–Muslim
riots in India, maintains that “[a]ssociations that would
suffer losses from a communal split ﬁght for their turf,
making not only their members aware of the dangers of
communal violence,but also thepublic at large.”Assuch,
any correlationbetweenriots andprosocialbehaviormay
simply be a product of reverse causality (see also Gupte
et al. 2014). Add to that the problem of endogeneity:
perpetrators do not choose communities at random,
compromising any simple comparisons between affected
and non-affected areas.
The present study sets out to clarify the link between
ethnic riots and prosocial behavior using micro-level
evidence fromKyrgyzstan.Given the intuitionprovided
by Horowitz and the weight of evidence from wartime
contexts, in a pre-analysis plan we had originally hy-
pothesized that the 2010Osh riot would have increased
prosociality within groups, while cooperation across
groups would have decreased.What we found squarely
rejects the ﬁrst part of the hypothesis: instead of in-
creasing community cohesion, the riot in fact lowered it.
This unexpected ﬁnding spurred us to closely examine
the evidence at hand and to formulate two new
mechanisms linking riots to prosocial behavior—the
disappointment and suspicion channels—which we
elaborate upon below.
THE 2010 OSH RIOT
A Brief History
Osh is the second largest and oldest city in Kyrgyzstan.
The city lies in the south, a few miles from the Uzbek
border (Figure 1). Having previously been ruled by
various local clans and khanates, Osh was annexed by
theRussianempire in 1876. In 1936,Oshwasmadepart
of the Soviet Union as part of the Kirghiz Soviet So-
cialist Republic (Kyrgyz SSR). As a predominantly
Uzbek town, Osh’s placement within the Kyrgyz
SSR (rather than the Uzbek SSR) was a seeming
anomaly—arguably, a deliberate strategy to “divide
and rule” (Allworth 2013).
It was not until the 1960s that ethnic Kyrgyz began to
settle in Osh. Spurred by rapid industrialization, rural
Kyrgyz dwellers sought new employment opportunities
in the risingurbancenters of theSovietUnion (Liu2012,
22). In the following years, the formerUzbek city slowly
turned into a multi-ethnic economic center. The two
dominant groups—Uzbeks and Kyrgyz—peacefully
coexisted throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Peaceful
relations were partly facilitated by the radically in-
clusive nationality policy promoted by the SovietUnion
(Dumitru and Johnson 2011).
Kyrgyzstan’s independence from the Soviet Union
marked the beginning of increased ethnic tensions.
Neither Kyrgyzstan nor Uzbekistan had a modern
history of statehood. To develop a national identity, the
FIGURE 1. Location of Kyrgyzstan and the City of Osh
Ethnic Riots and Prosocial Behavior
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new nations of Central Asia drew on ethnic narratives
(Huskey 2003, 34). Both states set up border posts,
which cut through long-established trading routes.
Uzbeks in Osh were thus separated from their “ethnic
homeland.”Tomakemattersworse,Kyrgyz authorities
continued to encourage the settlement of ethnicKyrgyz
in Uzbek areas, seeking to solidify control by means of
“demographic engineering” (Weiner and Teitelbaum
2001). On top of this, administrative borders were
drawn to ensure electoral majorities for Kyrgyz voters.
In Osh, for instance, heavily populated Uzbek neigh-
borhoods such as Kyzyl Kyshtak, Dikan Kyshtak, and
Padavan were excluded from the city of Osh despite
their proximity to the city center (see Figure A.1 of the
Online Appendix), while Kyrgyz villages were made
part of the city (Megoran 2013).
As a result of these policies, in 1990 Uzbeks in Osh
and several surrounding villages attempted to break
away from Kyrgyzstan, formally asking the USSR Su-
preme Soviet for the establishment of an autonomous
region. Their separatist ambitions were never fulﬁlled,
however. Instead, they triggered a counter-reaction in
the form of a ﬁrst ethnic riot between Uzbeks and
Kyrgyz.Theviolence left over 318peopledead (Huskey
2003, 34).
The conﬂict reemerged 20 years later. In April 2010,
the toppling of Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev
created a power vacuum. Fierce political competition
ensued. Ethnic Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan’s south continued
to support Bakiyev who came from the region. Having
suffered discrimination under Bakyiev, Osh’s Uzbek
populationwasnotably cooler.The interimgovernment
in Bishkek therefore relied on Uzbek supporters to
increase its political inﬂuence in the country’s south
(Human Rights Watch 2010, 21). The new leaders
speciﬁcally appealed to Uzbeks, condemning their
political exclusion and discrimination under the
Bakiyev regime. Localmedia and politicians reacted by
reinforcing local Kyrgyz’s fears. Above all, they suc-
cessfully mischaracterized the political instability as an
attempt by Uzbeks to secede (KIC 2011, 22–2).
On June 10, 2010, the situation escalated into full-
ﬂedgedviolence.Agambling-relatedargument inOsh’s
central casino provoked a violent confrontation be-
tween an Uzbek mob of 1,500 people and 30 Kyrgyz
police ofﬁcers. Stones thrown during the clash in-
advertently hit the local university’s female dormitory.
Rumors spread that Uzbek residents had raped Kyrgyz
girls. Motivated by what interviewed perpetrators
would later call a “patriotic impulse to fend off Uzbek
separatism,” and an “urge to defend their relatives,”
several thousand Kyrgyz from neighboring villages
started to make their way to Osh (KIC 2011, 27–9;
International Crisis Group, 2012, 2).
Before reachingOsh on June 11, theKyrgyz villagers
had armed themselves heavily. Weapons were seized
frompoorlydefendedborderposts nearOsh (KIC2011,
29). The perpetrators stole grenades, AK-47 automatic
weapons, sniper riﬂes, and bayonets (NHC 2012,
187–9). Once in Osh, the Kyrgyz perpetrators also
managed to take over armored personnel carriers
(APC). These happened to be located on two opposite
sides of Osh—at the Podgornaya crossroad in western
Osh and near the Furkhat roundabout in eastern
Osh—explainingaclear left–rightpattern in theensuing
riot (see Figure 2). Supported by these vehicles, two
Kyrgyz crowds subsequently marched toward the city
center. Any Uzbek residents or property on their way
came under attack.
Rampant disagreement among the perpetrators and
the presence of improvised weaponry meant that the
assault was often chaotic, with assailants plundering at
will and hurling Molotov cocktails at buildings that
rioters believed were inhabited by Uzbeks (see KIC
2011,30;HumanRightsWatch2010,4,23, 33;NHC2012,
67, 69). The riot lasted for four days, during which vir-
tually all Uzbeks of Osh had to fear for their lives.2 To
defend themselves,Uzbeks set upbarricades throughout
the city. They were instrumental in blocking access to
their neighborhoods (known as mahallas). There was,
however, little defending against the APCs captured by
the Kyrgyz rioters, which could easily break through the
barricades.
When the riot came toanendonJune13, anestimated
470 people were dead. 74% of casualties were ethnic
Uzbeks. 2,843 properties were entirely destroyed (KIC
2011, 44). During and immediately after the riot, many
Uzbek residents tried to ﬂee across the border to
Uzbekistan. However, the Uzbek authorities quickly
closed the border and urged those who had already
entered to return. The refugees themselves were con-
cerned about losing their Kyrgyz citizenship and
property.Asaresult, almost all of themreturned to their
former neighborhoods in Osh in the following weeks
(KIC 2011, 46).
One noteworthy feature of the riot was the relative
passiveness of the national Kyrgyz security apparatus.
The Kyrgyz military only intervened after four days of
heavy ﬁghting. Reports from independent sources note
that the late intervention was partly a product of the
impaired capacity of the central government, which had
toquellprotests inseveralpartsof thecountryat thesame
time (NHC 2012, 50). Osh’s local security authorities
were slightlymore involved. TheNHC report (2012, 85),
for instance, mentions various episodes in which local
security forces tried to intervene between the warring
groups. That said, local efforts to stop the rioters were
widely described as feeble and lacking courage.
Given the dramatic, chaotic nature of the riot, the
importance of APCs, and the swift return of the vic-
tims, the 2010Osh riot presents a suitable case to study
the link between ethnic riots and prosocial behavior.
The extent of the violence means that any effects on
prosociality likely persisted for years. The fact that
violence was haphazard—fueled by the availability of
APCs—allows us to construct a credible causal iden-
tiﬁcation strategy. In addition, the fact that Uzbeks
returned to Osh ameliorates concerns about non-
ignorable attrition.
2 Notably, FigureA.2 of theOnlineAppendix demonstrates that SOS
signals were sent across the entire city—not simply in areas that were
ultimately attacked.
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The Osh Riot in Comparative Perspective
How does the Osh riot compare to other ethnic riots
around the globe?Toaddress this question,we compiled
a list of all riots discussed in Horowitz (2001; see Online
Appendix A.1). We characterized riots along ﬁve key
dimensions for which Horowitz reports variation. Table
A.1 of the Online Appendix shows that Osh (2010) is
fairly typical with regard to (i) the minority status of the
Uzbek victims, (ii) the perpetrator elite support, (iii) the
scale of destruction, and (iv) the conﬂict history. Osh
differs from the majority of riots in that Uzbeks lacked
political inﬂuence, whereas in the majority of cases
(58%), victims tend to be politically inﬂuential. Taken
together, we thus view Osh as a rather typical case. It is
comparable to cases such as the anti-Chinese riots in
KualaLumpur (1969), the anti-Luba riots inLuluabourg
(1959), and the anti-Indian riots in Durban (1949–53).
DESIGN
Population
Our population of interest are the inhabitants of the city
of Osh. According to the 2009 census, Osh has 258,111
inhabitants, 44%ofwhich identify asUzbek, while 47%
identify as Kyrgyz (see Figure A.6 of the Online Ap-
pendix). The remainder comprises a variety of eth-
nicities including Russians and Tajiks. Geographically,
we focus on the historic city center, which we deﬁne as
the 2.5 km radius around Osh’s central bazaar. As in
manyCentralAsian countries, thebazaar is the cultural,
political, and social center of the city, with a trading
history stretching over 2,000 years (Welter, Smallbone,
and Isakova 2006, 103).
Exposure to Violence
To capture whether respondents were exposed to vi-
olence during the 2010 riots, we rely on data collected
shortly after the riot by the American Academy for the
AdvancementofScience (AAAS, 2010).Figure2 shows
the areas of the city that were destroyed or severely
damaged during the riot. We use this data to construct
a binary destruction dummy that indicates whether
a given primary sampling unit (PSU) was affected.
Destruction was severe, making it highly likely that
residents of PSUs at the time were directly affected by
the riot. This is shown in satellite images from 2010 (see
Figure 3). Still, to capture violence exposure at the
individual level, our survey also included an individual-
level victimization measure, which we discuss below.
Sampling
To gain a representative sample of Osh’s city center, we
employed amulti-stage randomsamplingmethod,which
we detail in Online Appendix A.3. We randomly sam-
pled880Uzbekand 220Kyrgyz respondents, drawing an
equal split from affected and non-affected areas. We
estimated the share of Kyrgyz and Uzbek individuals in
FIGURE 2. Destruction During the 2010 Osh Riot
Notes: The ﬁgure provides an overview of destroyed areas in Osh as of June 2010 (AAAS 2010).
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agivenPSUusingdata fromtheKyrgyzcensus,whichwe
combined with information on the prevalent housing
type inhabited by members of each group. The survey
took place between August and September 2017. The
period thuscoincidedwiththetemporary returnof labor
migrants fromRussia,whichminimizes concerns about
attrition (more in Online Appendix A.9). The de-
scriptive statisticsof theUzbekandKyrgyz samples are
provided in Online Appendix A.5. Table A.4 dem-
onstrates that destruction cannot be predicted on the
basis of individual-level covariates. Few variables are
signiﬁcant predictors of victimization, and coefﬁcients
are small. We discuss ethical considerations about
conducting a survey in a riot-ridden neighborhood in
Online Appendix A.4.
Measurement
Following Eisenberg and Mussen (1989, 3), we deﬁne
prosocial behavior as “voluntary actions that are
intended to help or beneﬁt another individual or group
of individuals.” These actions can take various forms.
We focus on two common types: cooperation and al-
truism, which we discuss in turn.We discuss the validity
of our measurement in Online Appendix A.7.
Cooperation
Ourmainmeasure of prosocial behavior is a two-player
(here referred to as ‘respondent’ and ‘partner’) pris-
oner’s dilemma (PD) game. The PD captures the tension
between individual proﬁt and collective beneﬁt and is
a widely usedmeasure of cooperation (Axelrod 1985). In
our variant of the PD, respondents were given the choice
between two options, ‘plus’ (the cooperative option) and
‘minus’ (the non-cooperative option). Their payoffs
depended on their own choice and that of their partner.
The individually proﬁt-maximizing combination was for
the respondent to choose ‘minus’while the partner chose
‘plus,’whilecollectiveproﬁtwasmaximized ifbothplayers
chose ‘plus.’ The payoffs were explained with a simple
graphic, which we reproduce in Figure 4. As can be seen,
respondents could earn between 20KGS (0.30USD) and
100 KGS (1.45 USD) in the PD. Given that the average
daily income in Kyrgyzstan in 2017 was 4.70 USD, the
stakes were thus rather high.
Before respondents made their choices, we informed
them that they would play the game twice, with two
different residents of Osh. Then, before each game, we
told respondents that the partner was either Kyrgyz or
Uzbek, in random order.3 To determine payoffs, par-
ticipants’ choices were randomly matched with the
choices of other Osh residents who had participated in
the pilot.We informedour participants that their choices
would be communicated to their partners via text mes-
sage, guaranteeing minimal visibility of their actions.4
FIGURE 3. Destruction During the 2010 Osh Riot (Detail)
Notes: The ﬁgure provides a satellite image of an exemplary victimized neighborhood (AAAS 2010).
3 In FigureA.20 of theOnlineAppendix, we demonstrate that all our
empirical results hold when using the ﬁrst decision only as the de-
pendent variable.
4 The script with the exact wording of the PD is reproduced in Online
Appendix A.6.
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Participants were then handed over the tablet used for
data collection and made their decisions in private.
Altruism
Our secondmeasure of prosocial behavior is the degree
to which individuals are willing to act altruistically. We
measure altruism using the non-strategic dictator game
(DG). Participants were given 50 KGS (0.70 USD) and
were asked to decide how much, if any, of this amount
they would share with another resident of Osh. To ease
implementation, respondents were allowed to choose
any share divisible by ﬁve. Since there is no sanctioning
mechanism in theDG, any positive amount shared with
another person is interpreted as an indication of al-
truistic behavior. Once again, before participants made
their choices, they were informed that they would play
the game twice. Then, before each game, respondents
were told that the partner was either Kyrgyz or Uzbek
(in random order). Participants were told that the
money shared with other players would be transferred
in mobile phone credit, but that no information about
the sender would be revealed. All survey respondents
who gave us their phone numbers were considered as
potential recipients of DG transfers.
Construct Validity
Do the primes “Kyrgyz” and “Uzbek” truly capture in-
and outgroup categories? Given that the riot occurred
along ethnic lines, it is relatively uncontroversial to
assume that Uzbek individuals perceive Kyrgyz
counterparts as the outgroup. But, do they also con-
sider coethnics as ingroup members? Uzbeks’ strong
sense of ethnic bonding is reﬂected in similar ap-
pearance, customs, gestures, language, clothing, tastes,
and habits (Liu 2012, 12). As Horowitz (2001, 47–8)
argues, the above cues of similarity confer a special
bonding power to ethnic identities. We conﬁrm this
conjecture by drawing on a small (N5 144) follow-up
telephone survey that we ﬁelded in Osh in September
2018 (see Online Appendix A.14). The data show that
60% of surveyed Uzbeks would not allow their
daughters to marry aMuslimman from another ethnic
group, be he Kyrgyz, Russian, or Tajik—even though
there are no religious rules forbidding such unions.
Respondents’ donation behavior in the dictator game
in the non-victimized areas can serve as another in-
dicator for the strength of ingroup identiﬁcation.Here,
Uzbeks gave 33% of their endowment to other
Uzbeks. This is comparable to levels of giving recorded
in other studies, where dictators usually pass on
20–30% (Camerer 2003), including to ingroup mem-
bers (Whitt andWilson 2007). The amount passedon is
therefore on the higher side, testifying to a consider-
able degree of ingroup solidarity. A ﬁnal piece of
evidence for strong ingroup bonding among Uzbeks
can be gathered from the Life in Kyrgyzstan survey
(implemented in 2010; Bru¨ck et al. 2014). While the
sample only includes 71OshUzbeks unaffected by the
riot, 89% of them state that they trust other coethnics,
with 63% expressing “a lot of trust.”
RESULTS
Simple Comparison
Does exposure to ethnic riots affect prosocial behav-
ior? To answer this question, we begin by simply
comparingUzbek respondents in the affected andnon-
affected PSUs. Figure 5 plots coefﬁcients and conﬁ-
dence intervals from an OLS regression of our out-
comes on the destruction dummy. The ﬁgure
demonstrates that Uzbek respondents residing in
damaged neighborhoods show substantially lower
levels of prosocial behavior. Affected Uzbeks are 0.16
SD (eight percentage points) less likely to cooperate
with a Kyrgyz individual in the PD. And they allocate
0.47 SD (14 out of 100 Som) less to Kyrgyz individuals
in theDG. Importantly, the reduction in cooperation is
also visible within the Uzbek community. Affected
Uzbeks are 0.23 SD less likely to cooperate with an
Uzbek individual in the PDand contribute 0.46 SD less
to other Uzbeks in the DG. Taken together, we thus
ﬁnd support for Horowitz’s ﬁrst hypothesis (reduced
intergroup cooperation). We do not, however, ﬁnd
support for Horowitz’s second hypothesis (increased
ingroup cooperation):Uzbeks in affected areas are less
likely toact prosocially, nomatterwhether theyengage
with a Kyrgyz or an Uzbek individual.5
Controlling for Confounders
Though there is evidence that the riot erupted un-
expectedly and that target selectionwas haphazard, riots
do not unfold at random. A variety of social, economic,
and political forcesmay explain why some areas, but not
others, are exposed to violence (see Kopstein and
FIGURE 4. Payoff Illustration in the PD
Notes: Theﬁgure reproduces thegraphicused to illustratepayoffs
for respondents (You) and their partner (Partner) during the
prisoner’s dilemma game. Amounts are indicated in Kyrgyz Som
(KGS).
5 We highlight a noteworthy similarity between effect sizes across the
in- and outgroup measures. One interpretation of this ﬁnding is that
Uzbek victims leveled equal blame to coethnics and perpetrators.
Uzbek victims may have had high (and thus easy to disappoint)
expectations about cooperation fromother coethnics, while theywere
understandably appalled by the Kyrgyz perpetrators. This resonates
with Becchetti, Conzo, and Romeo’s (2014) work, which shows that
victims of post-election violence in Kenya exhibit a comparable re-
duction in trustworthiness in experimental games played with in- and
outgroup members.
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Wittenberg 2018; Wilkinson 2004). The simple re-
gression is thus likely subject to confounding forces that
determine both victimization and prosocial behavior.
Based on a review of the qualitative literature covering
theOshriotanddrawingon interviewswith localexperts,
we distilled four plausible confounders: wealth, state
capacity, community policing, and accessibility. To save
space, we discuss our measurement of these variables in
OnlineAppendixA.8. In Table 1, we show our results to
be robust to the inclusion of the potential confounders as
well as thevote sharegarneredby theAta-Jurt (AJ)party
during the 2010 general elections, which we use as
a measure of support for the overthrown Kyrgyz Presi-
dent Bakiyev.
Attrition
Even if confounders are appropriately addressed,
our research design runs the risk of suffering from
non-ignorable attrition. It could be that the riot led co-
operative people to leave the affected areas. Any differ-
ences between the affected and non-affected areas would
then not be due to victimization, but due to selective
migration patterns. In Online Appendix A.9, we present
four reasons that boost our conﬁdence that attrition is of
minor concern. First, we show that 97% of respondents
have never lived elsewhere. Second, respondents state
that few individuals havemigrated since 2009. Third, self-
reported migration is similar across victimized and non-
victimized areas. Fourth, we estimate bounds for the es-
timatedshareofattritorsandshowourresults toberobust.
Robustness Tests
In the Appendix, we conﬁrm the robustness of our key
ﬁndings in four additional ways. We show that all
estimates remain strongly signiﬁcant when (i) aggre-
gating the individual-level data at the PSU-level, (ii)
when adjusting standard errors for spatial autocorre-
lation using three independent connectivity matrices,
(iii) when estimating spatial lag models (Online Ap-
pendix A.10), and (iv) when matching PSUs on pre-
treatment covariates using a rather strict caliper of 0.05
(Online Appendix A.11).
Instrumental Variable
Even when controlling for confounders, one might
worry that unobserved variables explain post-riot dif-
ferences across damaged and non-damaged PSUs. To
address this concern, this section introduces a pre-
registered instrumental variable strategy. We exploit
the fact that the riot was inﬂicted by Kyrgyz villagers
from outside of Osh who relied on APCs to break
through the barricades set up by Uzbek residents. This
ﬁnding is documented in three independent reports by
the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, the Norwegian
Helsinki Committee, and Human Rights Watch.
MostUzbeks inOsh, as in otherCentralAsian cities,
live in so-called mahallas. These typically include
20–50 houses, which are clustered around a mosque or
central square. Mahallas are tightly knit communities
“controlled and monitored by the local community
[and] […] accessible only to members of the commu-
nity” (Kutmanaliev 2015, 457). Despite the construc-
tion of multi-story apartment buildings during the
Soviet Era, Osh’s Uzbek population has largely
remained in the historic mahallas (Liu 2012).
Crucially, the mahallas marked an effective hin-
drance to the Kyrgyz perpetrators. The mahallas
allowed Uzbeks to set up barricades and road blocks,
which “played an important role in saving some of the
neighborhoods from violence” (Kutmanaliev 2017,
453). Without the use of armored vehicles, Kyrgyz
perpetrators could not have accessed the mahallas.
Human Rights Watch writes:
The attacks on Osh Uzbek neighborhoods […] show
a consistent pattern. In many accounts, individuals in
camouﬂage uniforms on armored military vehicles entered
the neighborhoods ﬁrst, removing the makeshift barricades
that Uzbek residents had erected. They were followed by
armed men who shot and chased away any remaining res-
idents, and cleared the way for the looters (Human Rights
Watch 2010, 4).
The ability of the Kyrgyz perpetrators to enter and
destroy Uzbek neighborhoods was thus largely a func-
tion of whether military vehicles were at their disposal.
Indeed, on the night of June 10, Kyrgyz gangs had been
unable tobreak intoUzbekmahallas. Itwasnotuntil the
rioters had managed to capture armored military
vehicles on June 11 that they successfully entered the
Uzbek mahallas.
AreaswhereAPCswerenot availablewitnessed little
to no destruction. The map in Figure A.6 of the Online
Appendix helps explain this logic. It demonstrates that
many neighborhoods of Osh were plausible targets for
FIGURE 5. Effect of Riot on Prosocial Behavior
Notes: The ﬁgure plots point estimates (dot) and 90/95%
conﬁdence intervals (thick and thin lines, respectively) of OLS
regressions of the indicated outcomeson the destruction dummy.
All outcomes are standardized (DoF 5 876).
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the rioters. Large parts of Osh are predominantly Uz-
bek. The few areas that did see destruction lie on the
direct path toOsh from locations fromwhich theKyrgyz
military sent APCs to quell the riot. To break into the
mahallas,Kyrgyzperpetratorsmanaged to steal someof
theAPCs. InwesternOsh, they stole themdirectly from
a military barrack. In the east, the rioters appropriated
the APCs while on their way to the city center—at the
Furkhat roundabout.6 The precise locations are shown
in Figure 7. The following account illustrates how
perpetrators took hold of the APCs:
[T]hree army APCs […] were stopped by a crowd of 4,000
people […] Ofﬁcers and soldiers were dragged out of the
APC and beaten up. Amechanic/driver managed to put one
APC out of use […]. The second APC was seized by the
crowd. The third managed to get out of the crowd and
reached the command center by sideroads. Similar
descriptions of the events are found in the report of Ismail
Isakov [the Special Representative of the Provisional
Government for Southern Kyrgyzstan] (NHC 2012, 131).
All this is not to say that distance fromAPCs is the sole
driver of victimization. While destruction on the direct
path of the APCs toward the city center was nearly
universal, certain individuals undoubtedly managed to
selectoutofviolence.Distance to theAPCsthuscaptures
the intent-to-treat effect. Put differently, the IV setup
estimates the effect of victimization on prosocial be-
havior by focusing on the plausibly exogenous
assignment process, namely distance to the APCs. All
PSUs on this path are then coded as victimized—even if
some may not have complied with the “treatment.” As
such, the IV setup is rather conservative. If we simply
usedvictimization as the independent variable, the effect
would be larger, though biased.
IV Assumptions
To use the location of the APCs as an instrumental
variable, wemust invoke ﬁve assumptions.Wewill only
brieﬂydiscuss the assumptions in themain text and refer
readers to the SI for a more detailed discussion (see
Online Appendix A.12). There, we make ﬁve points.
First, we show that distance to the APCs is strongly
correlated with the destruction dummy (F-Stat of
271.9). Second, we rule out deﬁers, i.e., individuals
selecting to be victimized despite not being “assigned.”
Third, we present a falsiﬁcation test which corroborates
that the instrument is unrelated to prosocial behavior in
a sample of 136 nearby villages, thus underlining the
exclusion restriction. Fourth, we address SUTVA
concerns by estimating spatial error models. Fifth, we
argue that the location of the APCs is likely exogenous
and support this assumption by showing that distance is
not predicted by the aforementioned confounders.
What, however, if the Kyrgyz military strategically
positioned the APCs so as to victimize some Uzbek
mahallas, while sparing Uzbeks they deemed loyal?
This logic does not apply to the barrack in western Osh,
which had been present for decades. But, the second
APC location, the Furkhat roundabout, could theo-
reticallybeplaguedby suchconfounding.Three reasons
make this selection pattern unlikely. First, the APCs
TABLE 1. Effect of Destruction on Prosocial Behavior (Controlling for Confounders andMobilization)
Cooperation in
prisoner’s dilemma
ingroup
Investment in
dictator game
ingroup
Cooperation in prisoner’s
dilemma outgroup
Investment in dictator
game outgroup
Prosociality
index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Destruction 20.387*** 20.575*** 20.267*** 20.537*** 20.442***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.053)
Wealth index 0.433 0.503 0.801* 0.586 0.581*
(0.328) (0.319) (0.330) (0.320) (0.232)
State capacity
index
0.177 0.679*** 0.138 0.677*** 0.418***
(0.146) (0.142) (0.147) (0.142) (0.103)
Community
policing index
0.076* 20.081* 0.048 20.081* 20.009
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.023)
Accessibility
index
0.362 20.500 20.120 20.526 20.196
(0.308) (0.300) (0.310) (0.300) (0.218)
AJ% 0.767*** 0.488* 0.488* 0.083 0.457**
(0.225) (0.219) (0.226) (0.219) (0.159)
N 878 878 878 878 878
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.083 0.019 0.081 0.080
Notes: The table reports point estimates and standard errors of linear regressions of the indicated prosocial behavior outcome on the
destruction dummy, controlling for the four indicated confounders plus the vote share obtained by theAta-Jurt (AJ) party in the 2010 general
elections. All outcomes are standardized. *p , 0.05; **p , 0.01; ***p , 0.001.
6 TheAPCs stolen near theFurkhat roundabout hadbeen sent toOsh
from the Jalal-Abad province (Mayli-Suu) because Osh’s security
forces lacked APCs (they had lost several APCs during clashes with
demonstrators in theTalas provincea fewweeksprior to theOsh riot).
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stolen at the roundabout were sent from the province of
Jalal-Abad, taking the most direct path toward Osh.
There is thus no evidence that the APCs were strate-
gically placed. Second, we collected precinct-level
voting data from elections right after the riot. Based
on this data, we can rule out that non-victimized areas
weremore likely tovote in favorof the local government
(see Online Appendix A.17; note, however, that this
analysis is post-treatment). Third, in Table A.6 of the
Online Appendix we show that respondents in vic-
timized PSUs in eastern Osh were not more likely to
agree with the statement “people likeme have no say in
what government does.” This, then, suggests that loy-
alist Uzbeks were unlikely to be underrepresented in
victimized areas, implying that they were not system-
atically protected from local authorities. Taken to-
gether, there is thus no evidence that the second APC
location was “selected.” Even so, to rule out any
remaining concerns, in Figure A.12 of the Online Ap-
pendix we restrict our IV analysis (more below) to
western Osh—the area where selection could not have
taken place—and ﬁnd treatment effects, if anything, to
be larger.
IV Results
Having brieﬂy discussed the core IV assumptions, we
estimate the following two-equation system:
Yi ¼ b0 þ b1Xi þ «i; (1)
Xi ¼ b0 þ b1Zi þ «i; (2)
whereYi are our prosociality outcomes for individual i,
Xi depicts victimization, andZi is individual i’s distance
to the nearest location where APCs were stolen. We
estimate the equations using two-stage least squares, as
well as by simply instrumenting X with Z.
In Figure 6, we plot the coefﬁcients and conﬁdence
intervals of three separate IV-models. Focusing on the
two-stage least-square model (squares), we estimate
that destruction during the riot—instrumented using
distance to thebarracks—reducesprosocialbehaviorby
0.55 SD. Again, the ﬁnding holds for both in- and
outgroupprosociality. Importantly, theﬁnding is similar
when substituting the destruction dummy with the
closeness instrument (triangle) and also detectable
when aggregating the data at the PSU-level and
adjusting for spatial autocorrelation (ﬂipped triangle).
Randomization Inference
In a ﬁnal step, we develop a randomization inference
procedure to further probe the robustness of our
ﬁndings. Our goal is to assess how likely it is to observe
an effect of the size reported inFigure 6 if the location of
thebarrackshadbeenchosen randomly.Putdifferently,
we want to gauge how likely it is that our result could
arise by chance. To answer this question, we simulate
pseudo locations where APCs could have been stolen.
To do so, we map the two actual locations from which
APCs were stolen (red stars) and then simulate pseudo
theft locations (“APC starting points”) within a band
around the city center, stretching from the closer theft
location to the farther (seeFigure7).Wesimulate a total
of 10,000 pseudo starting points for the APCs, 5,000 to
the east and 5,000 to thewest of the riverAk-Buura that
splits the city from north to south. We then re-estimate
our reduced-form IV regression 10,000 times. For each
estimation, we draw two pseudo-starting points—one
fromtheeasternandone fromthewestern sample—and
calculate the distance between these starting points and
the interview locations. We then regress our proso-
ciality index on these pseudo-distances and store the
estimates.
The results from this procedure are given in Figure 8.
The distribution of effect sizes shows that most pseudo-
distances to hypothetical APC locations do not yield
a sizable negative correlation with the prosociality in-
dex. Only 421 simulations result in a more negative
effect size thanobserved in reality, corresponding toap-
value of 0.042 (one-sided). Our estimated effect is thus
unlikely to be a product of chance. Interestingly, the
analysis does demonstrate that, on average, closeness to
hypothetical APC theft locations is associated with
a slight drop in prosocial behavior: the distribution’s
mean is 20.03. Most likely, this is due to the fact that
individuals residing closer to major roads (who are,
hence, closer to the hypothetical theft locations) show
lower levels of prosocial behavior. This conjecture,
however, is not conﬁrmed when visually inspecting
prosociality patterns inOsh. A heat map of prosociality
FIGURE 6. Effect of Riot Destruction on
Prosocial Behavior (IV)
Notes: The ﬁgure plots point estimates (marker) and 90/95%
conﬁdence intervals (thick and thin lines, respectively) of
regressions of the indicated outcomes on the distance to the
closest barrack measure (instrument) or the destruction dummy
instrumented with the distance measure (2SLS). SAM refers to
a model in which standard errors are adjusting for spatial
autocorrelation using the travel time connectivity matrix (see
OnlineAppendixA.10).All outcomesarestandardized.Allmodels
draw on 876 DoF, except for the SAM models, which are
aggregated at the PSU-level (194 DoF).
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inOsh (FigureA.13of theOnlineAppendix) shows that
prosocial behavior does not cluster along major roads.
Rather, there are no distinct geographic patterns.
Moreover, the virtue of randomization inference is that
it controls—or, rather, “breaks”—any geospatial clus-
tering. It takes such data patterns into account by
shifting the distribution against which the effect must
survive to the left. Therefore, our observed effect of
minus 0.111 stands out even in the face of a general
pattern of negative prosociality along locations close to
the APC theft locations. And given that randomization
inference makes no distributional assumptions (it is
fully nonparametric), it, to our minds, is the most
convincing piece of evidence that our ﬁnding is causal
and not a product of chance.
MECHANISMS
We have demonstrated a robust negative correlation
between riot destruction and prosocial behavior. Is this
ﬁnding a product of victimization? And, if so, how did
victimization destroy bonds even within the Uzbek
community? To answer these questions, we ﬁrst scru-
tinize whether the main causal channel is, indeed, vic-
timization, drawing on two pieces of evidence.
Victimization
First, we use a survey item on victimization, namely
property losses. The survey included the following
question: “During the past 10 years, did you lose any of
the following things due to some misfortune? Please
mark all that apply.”Due to the sensitivity of the topic,
we chose this itemover straightforward questions about
physical harm or losses during the riot. Respondents
were given the following options: car, TV, house,
money, business, and other. Given that some of these
losses plausibly took place as a result of the riot, we can
construct an individual-level victimization measure.
Reassuringly, Figure 9 conﬁrms that residents in af-
fected areaswere signiﬁcantlymore likely to suffer from
the loss of a house, business, money, or TV—all items
that were damaged or stolen during the riot. What is
more, the effect sizes are pronounced, which underlines
that the destruction dummy does indeed capture the
victimized areas of Osh.
We also check if the individual-level victimization
measure affects prosocial behavior. Such an analysis
is undoubtedly subject to confounding (property as
well as property losses are not exogenous).Toaddress
this concern, we again instrument the individual
victimization measure with distance to APCs. Figure
A.14 of the Online Appendix conﬁrms a strong
negative correlation between the index and prosocial
behavior. The ﬁnding thus supports the intuition that
Uzbeks became less prosocial because they were
victimized.
Second, we make use of the Kyrgyz sample. Some
Kyrgyz individuals also lived in areas affected by the
riot. They were not victimized, however. Rather, they
happened to live in neighborhoods with a large Uzbek
population, which was targeted by the Kyrgyz mob.
These Kyrgyz individuals are thus a suitable com-
parison group to assess whether victimization, not
a general destruction channel, drives the reduction in
prosocial behavior. In Figure A.17 of the Online
Appendix, we demonstrate that the prosociality index
is essentially unmoved amongKyrgyz individuals. The
index is roughly 0.05 SD lower in destructed areas.
However, the accompanying standard error is large
(0.11).
FIGURE 7. Pseudo APC Theft Locations
Notes: The ﬁgure plots the locations where the APCs were
captured (red stars) and 10,000 randomly-drawn pseudo APC
locations. Thepseudo locationswere drawn fromwithin the green
band, which was centered around Osh’s bazar such that it
includes the two observed APC locations.
FIGURE 8. Randomization Inference
Notes: The ﬁgure presents a density plot of estimated effect sizes
of a regression of the prosociality index on the barrack distance
instrument, using 10,000 randomly-drawnpseudodistances. The
graydotted lineplots theobservedeffect sizewhenusingdistance
to the actual locations where APCs were stolen.
Ethnic Riots and Prosocial Behavior
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Economic hardship
Given the widespread loss of property during the riots,
one may ask whether economic hardships could be
responsible for the reduced levels of prosociality we are
observing. Property destruction during the riot might
have made victims poorer and thus less able to afford
prosocial behavior toward their ingroup. Alternatively,
victimization might have increased levels of inequality,
fueling resentment.7 The available evidence does not
support these ideas, however.Current income levels are
not signiﬁcantly correlated with victimization (see
Table A.4 of the Online Appendix). In fact, in 2017,
affected households were marginally wealthier than
non-affected ones (with a monthly income of 317 USD
versus 299 USD, respectively). While victimized
households certainly suffered economic hardships im-
mediately after the riot, there is no evidence that they
still do so seven years later. If anything, we see that
inequality is lower in victimized areas, with a Gini co-
efﬁcient of 0.28, compared to 0.32 in non-victimized
neighborhoods.
To further test the economic channel,we investigate
heterogeneous treatment effects conditional on pre-
riot levels of wealth (measured at the PSU-level). If
victimized households became less prosocial due to
ﬁnancial hardship, we should observe a greater re-
duction in prosociality in areas that were poorer be-
fore the riot and thus—arguably—more severely
affected by property losses. We do not ﬁnd evidence
on this point either. In fact, the reduction in proso-
ciality is uniform across neighborhoods, no matter
their economic situation before the riot (see Figure
A.15 of the Online Appendix). Economic hardship,
therefore, does not seem to explain why the riot
undermined prosocial behavior among Uzbek
victims.
Why the Reduction in Ingroup Bonding?
How, then, can we explain the novel ﬁnding that
victimization led to a reduction in prosocial behavior
within the Uzbek community? In our pre-analysis
plan, we had hypothesized that exposure to violence
would increase ingroup solidarity, and we had for-
mulated mechanisms that could explain this ﬁnding
(laid out in Online Appendix A.15). These were (i)
a decline in risk preferences, (ii) increased identiﬁ-
cation with the ingroup, and (iii) investment in com-
munity protection due to fear of future conﬂict.
Unsurprisingly, our empirical analysis shows no
support for these mechanisms (see Figure A.21 of the
Online Appendix). This is reassuring inasmuch as the
mechanisms should not be affected, given that we do
notﬁnd an increase in ingroupprosociality. To explain
the surprising reduction in ingroup prosociality, we
therefore draw on qualitative interviews conducted
during three months of ﬁeldwork. Our sources in-
cluded local Uzbek and Kyrgyz residents and stu-
dents, NGO workers, academics, as well as
representatives of the survey ﬁrm. From our inter-
views, we condensed two channels: a disappointment
and a suspicion channel.
Disappointment
The ﬁrst channel might best be described as a “disap-
pointment” mechanism. Uzbek victims repeatedly
complained that other Uzbeks had “let them down”
during the riot. For example, many Uzbeks refused to
provide shelter to other Uzbeks during the riot. One of
Kutmanaliev’s (2017) interviewees noted that Uzbek
leaders in Nariman (a village in northern Osh)
instructed their community not to host Uzbek refugees.
The leader is cited as follows: “We won’t let anyone
enter our village. Don’t host refugees in your houses.
Let them go and pass elsewhere, wherever they want to
go” (Kutmanaliev 2017, 213). One of our own inter-
viewees who tried to escape from Osh during the riot
told us that his car was stopped by coethnics from an-
other mahalla. As a result, he could not leave the city.
The fact that the Uzbek government sent Uzbek ref-
ugees back to Kyrgyzstan was another example of
Uzbeks letting down their own ethnic group.
The feeling of being let down also extended toUzbek
community leaders.While local leaders negotiatedwith
both law enforcement authorities and Kyrgyz elders,
their efforts turned out to be fruitless (KIC2011, 31). To
manyUzbeks, the failure to settle peace signiﬁed a lack
of leadership and an inability to safeguard the well-
being of the Uzbek community. It therefore came as no
surprise that Uzbeks in victimized mahallas began
viewing community leadership as a “meaningless in-
stitution.” In the victimized Karajygach mahalla, for
example, Uzbeks did not even protest when long-
FIGURE9. Effect ofRiotDestructiononLosses
Notes: The Figure plots point estimates (marker) and 90/95%
conﬁdence intervals (thick and thin lines, respectively) of OLS
regressions of the indicated losses on the destruction dummy. All
outcomes are binary (DoF 5 876).
7 We are grateful to one anonymous reviewer for suggesting these
mechanisms.
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standing leaders were replaced by local bureaucrats
after the riot (Ismailbekova 2013, 115). One of the
former leaders,Muhtar aka, confessed that even before
being replaced he had struggled to deal with physical
assaults and sexual harassments in his neighborhood.
He initially advised community members to report
these events to the police, but, according to his own
words, residents refused to follow his advice (Ismail-
bekova 2013, 116).
Uzbek victims also complained that other Uzbeks,
including key leaders, did not participate in the relief
operation in the late summer of 2010. One local NGO
representative, for instance, noted that the re-
construction of destroyed mahallas was almost exclu-
sively ﬁnanced by international NGOs and the
victimized families. This is conﬁrmed in our small
follow-up telephone survey, which shows that none of
59 re-interviewed victimized households received any
ﬁnancial help from coethnics during the year of the riot.
Uzbeks that escaped the violence proved reluctant to
contribute to the reconstruction of the destroyed
mahallas, exacerbating the feeling of being let down.
Following this disappointment channel, one can
conceptualize the reduction in prosociality as “ethnic
punishment,” whereby Uzbek victims penalized other
Uzbeks for the lack of support during and after the riot.
This interpretation links the mechanism to the wider
literature on the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod
1985; Bowles andGintis 2004; Smirnov et al. 2010). This
literature highlights how punishment is central to
maintaining cooperative relations in the long run, es-
pecially in cases where the cooperation partner defec-
ted—which clearly was the case within the Uzbek
community in Osh.8 Punishment here serves both
a retaliative function—communicating that exploita-
tion is unacceptable—and a restorative function:
through punishment, the partner is to be persuaded to
return to cooperative behavior (Ostrom, Gardner, and
Walker 1994). Findings from the literature on war and
cooperationare in linewith this reasoning.Forexample,
Gneezy and Fessler (2012) ﬁnd that non-cooperation
was more severely punished during the Israel-
–Hezbollahwar than during peace time.AndBecchetti,
Conzo, and Romeo (2014) show that victims of the
Kenyan post-election violence react with starkly re-
duced prosociality when their trust is misused in
a previous round of behavioral games.
Suspicion
A second channel relayed to us in interviews may be
described as a feeling of “suspicion.” Given the hap-
hazardnatureof the riot, victimizedUzbeks began to ask
why they, not other Uzbeks, had been targeted. During
qualitative interviews,victimswould frequentlyask“why
me?” Many victims did not want to accept that, at the
local level, no particular individual was to blame for the
riot (KIC 2011, 71–6). The search for answers fueled
suspicion.Rumors spreadamongvictimized families that
non-victimized Uzbeks had brokered deals with the
Kyrgyz assailants—despite a lack of concrete evidence.
One infamous example of suspicion concerned
a restaurant in one of the attacked mahallas. While the
mahalla was partly destroyed by the attackers, the
restaurant in questionwas spared. Shortly after the riot,
the restaurant was renamed after a Kyrgyz hero. One
interviewee noted that local Uzbeks had grown in-
creasingly suspicious of the restaurant’s owners, sus-
pecting them of having secretly collaborated with
Kyrgyz rioters. For some, the new name of the res-
taurant was deﬁnitive proof of treason.9
In other cases, victims expressed suspicion toward the
Uzbek community at large. In interviews conducted by
the Norwegian Helsinki Committee (2012, 39) Uzbek
victims stated that during the riot they had heard stories
that “unknown [Uzbek] men in black T-shirts inter-
rupted the attempts to enter into negotiations with the
police and provoked the crowd to action.” Although
none of these accounts could be conﬁrmed, as the report
concludes, the victims became convinced of a large-scale
“conspiracy”behind the riot,whichhad supposedlybeen
put together by other Uzbeks. Our own interviewees
made similar comments. One interviewee from the
Oshski Rayon, for instance, suspected the Uzbeki gov-
ernment to be behind the riot so as to justify a military
intervention in Kyrgyzstan (which did not materialize).
Feelings of suspicion were also fueled by the per-
ceivedunfairness of being victimized.One common line
of thinking among victimized Uzbeks was that other
Uzbeks were responsible for the riot because they had
protested against theBakiyev government inApril 2010
(an event believed to have sparked the riot). This
sentiment was relayed to us in several interviews con-
ducted in the area of Furkhat. Victimized Uzbeks
portrayed the protesters as “provocateurs” who had
brought destruction and death to many innocent
Uzbeks. Meanwhile, the protesters themselves, it was
argued, had managed to stay out of trouble (see also
Kutmanaliev 2017). The fact that Kadyrzhan
Batyrov—a nationalistUzbek leaderwidely believed to
have stirred ethnic tensions inApril 2010—escaped and
found refuge in Sweden was a frequent example of the
perceived injustice brought up during our interviews.
The suspicion channel resonates with the ﬁndings of
reduced levels of trust in the aftermath of large-scale
violence (Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt 2013; Rohner,
Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013). A classic explanation of
this pattern comes from a study on the slave trade in
seventeenth-centuryAfrica byNunn andWantchekon
8 Interpreting reduced prosociality as punishment may also help
explain why we record opposite effects from those expected under
“post-traumatic growth” theory. In this theory, growth stems partly
from the experience of help by others (cp. Tedeschi and Calhoun
2004). What Uzbeks in Osh experienced was the outright lack of
support from their coethnics, undermining the potential for post-
traumatic growth.
9 When we visited the restaurant, the owners explained to us that the
new name was meant to attract Kyrgyz customers and minimize the
risk of harassment from the Kyrgyz-dominated police. Shortly after
the riot, the police extorted many Uzbek businesses, a fact conﬁrmed
by Ismailbekova (2013). Thenamechange, if anything, thus resembles
a peace signal and demonstrates that local-level suspicion was
unwarranted.
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(2011). The authors note that a hallmark of the slave
trade was that individuals could partly protect them-
selves by turning against others within their commu-
nity. Many sold neighbors to the traders in exchange
for captives and arms, which eroded trust in the af-
fected localities. InOsh, themere suspicion of betrayal
appears to have had a similar effect. Ethnographic
ﬁeldwork indicates that the riot undermined many
cooperative behaviors, such as lending money for
weddings or participation in traditional voluntary
communal aid (hashar) (Liu 2012, 130). It also made
personalized forms of prosociality, targeting the
closest family, more prominent (Ismailbekova 2013,
120).
Testing the Mechanisms
Can our survey evidence yield quantitative support for
our qualitative evidence? Two suggestive pieces of
evidence support the claim that the riot created dis-
appointment and suspicion within the Uzbek com-
munity. The ﬁrst piece of evidence comes from the
prisoner’s dilemma game. After each decision in the
PD, we asked respondents what they believed their
partner would do. In Table A.13 of the Online Ap-
pendix, we relate these expectations to actual behav-
ior. The table demonstrates that the share of
respondents expecting non-cooperation from their
coethnic partners, and who consequently did not co-
operate themselves, is higher in victimized than in non-
victimized areas (19 versus 14%)—an indication for
continued suspicion. Interestingly, we also observe
that the share of those that did not cooperate, even
though they believed that their counterpart would
cooperate, is also higher in victimized areas (24 versus
18%). While this behavior could be seen as mere
selﬁshness, we believe it is better interpreted as an
intentional act of punishment for previous non-
cooperation.
The second piece of suggestive evidence comes from
a supplementary analysis in which we interact our in-
strument with a survey item that captures respondents’
fear of future conﬂict (see Online Appendix A.16). In
line with our mechanisms, Figure A.16 of the Online
Appendix shows that a reduction in ingroupprosociality
is not observed among Uzbek victims who expect other
riots to happen in Osh. These Uzbeks cannot afford to
let their suspicion drive them to punish coethnics or
withdraw from cooperative relations within their
community. They are aware that they may need their
coethnics’ help if another riot erupts. Therefore, they
continue to invest in positive community relations,
hoping to secure future support.
DISCUSSION
This article has explored whether ethnic riots affect pro-
social behavior. Drawing on evidence from the 2010 Osh
riot, we found that victimized neighborhoods show lower
levels of cooperation and altruism. VictimizedUzbeks not
only cooperated lesswithKyrgyz counterparts—thegroup
of the perpetrators—but also less with other Uzbeks. We
argued that the reduction in prosocial behavior toward the
ingroup is due to two channels: a feeling of being let down
by one’s coethnics, and suspicion toward non-victimized
neighbors.
Under what conditions might one expect ethnic riots
to reduce ingroup cohesion, as was the case inOsh? Put
differently, can we spell out scope conditions that allow
us to speak to the generalizability of our ﬁndings? The
considerations that follow are necessarily tentative.
That said, two interrelated conditions likely exacer-
bated the disappointment and suspicion channels. First
is the widespread perception that the riot was un-
expected and chaotic. Second is the fact that the riot was
a rare, one-off event.Wediscussboth conditions in turn.
Suspicion within a victimized community is particu-
larly likely to arise when ethnic violence erupts un-
expectedly and unravels in a chaotic manner. The
“intense” and “sudden”nature of riots, to citeHorowitz
(2001, 1), leaves victims clueless as to who the ﬁghting
actors are, what motivates them, and why some com-
munity members, but not others, are targeted. By most
accounts, theOsh riotwasdisorganizedand lacked clear
leadership. Kyrgyz elders were unable to stop their
coethnics from attacking Uzbek mahallas (KIC 2011,
37–8). To neutral observers, the riot thus resembled
what Horowitz (2001) called a collective “amok”—a
frenzy of goalless killing. For the Uzbek victims, the
uncertainty surrounding the violence led to a desperate
search for answers, fueling suspicion toward coethnics
that had managed to remain unscathed. Put differently,
had the riot been the result of careful planning onbehalf
of the Kyrgyz perpetrators, unfolding along clear front
lines, the Uzbek community could plausibly have mo-
bilized more effectively. And suspicion and mistrust
would likely have been less pronounced.
The second channel, disappointment with one’s
fellow coethnics, is particularly likely to materialize if
ethnic violence is as a rare, one-off event.By contrast, if
riots are a repeating event—as is the case in Lucknow,
India, for instance—individuals are less likely to get
disappointed by their coethnics for two main reasons:
First, the repeated occurrence of violence means that
individuals are accustomed to collectively resist attacks
and can establish precise codes of conduct. Second, re-
peated rioting gives individuals an incentive to rush to
their neighbors’ defense.After all, the next riot is already
on the horizon. Cooperation is thus made viable by the
needforprotectionfromfutureviolence. Inanapparently
unique event like the Osh riot, however, defection in the
form of non-help is the dominant strategy, disappointing
the hopes of those in need of support.
Based on these two conditions, one can make an
informed guess about the generalizability of our key
ﬁnding. If interethnic ﬁghting is chaotic and one-off, it
can reduce cooperation within the victimized group.
According to our own quantiﬁcation of the riots docu-
mented by Horowitz (2001), the above description ﬁts
a number of riots in post-Soviet countries,Europe and the
United States. This includes the riots in Novy Uzen,
Kazakhstan (1989), Nottingham, England (1958), and
Beaumont,Texas(1943), tonameafew.Suchriotsemerge
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at the time of critical junctures, such as the collapse of
empires, unexpected transitions of power, the in-
troductionof revolutionarypolicies,or rapiddemographic
changes. What sets them apart from other riots is the
unexpected, novel exposure to violence, the disorganized
nature of ﬁghting, and the lack of leadership. Tentatively,
one might therefore also expect our ﬁnding to apply in
some types ofwar, especially guerrillawar.Here, violence
is often directed against civilians and perpetrated by
combatants in civilian disguise. Individuals exposed to
such violence have been shown to grow increasingly
suspicious of their neighbors (Krakowski 2018). This in
turn may overshadow their incentives to invest in com-
munity relations.
Our evidence also helps address two questions raised by
Wilkinson(2009) inhisreviewoftheriot literature.First,we
have shown the effect of riots on prosocial behavior to be
lasting.Weobserveda stark reduction inprosociality seven
years after the riot took place. Riots, despite being short,
have long-term consequences. Second, our evidence helps
answer the question of causal order. In discussing Var-
shney’s (2002) Ethnic conﬂict and civic life, Wilkinson
(2009) asks whether peace is the cause or consequence of
interethnic associational life. Our evidence points toward
peace as a cause more than a consequence.
What we found leaves little in the way of optimism.
The effect of the riot appears to have been nefarious
throughout. Our ﬁndings can therefore resonate with
earlier research on war, which generally highlights the
destructive effects of war on physical, human and social
capital (Collier 2003). Partly in response to this litera-
ture, the international community started to focus on
community building and reconciliation programs fol-
lowing war. While these are discussed controversially,
there is someevidence that suchprograms have positive
effects (Fearon, Humphreys, andWeinstein 2009). Our
evidence suggests that focusing solely on interethnic
animositiesmay be shortsighted. Instead, reconciliation
programs will need to address communal rifts both
across and within groups.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please
visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541900042X.
Replication materials can be found on Dataverse at:
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WVBZNE.
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